

10 MAY 1972

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
10 MAY 1972
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION - 7 MAY 1972

Moscow (2397 items)

| | | |
|----------------------|--------|-----|
| May Day | (10%) | 19% |
| [Podgornyy Speech | (--) | 5%] |
| VE Day | (--) | 8% |
| Indochina | (10%) | 9% |
| [Paris Talks | (1%) | 3%] |
| [FLAF Successes | (0.3%) | 3%] |
| [Strikes on DRV & | (6%) | 2%] |
| Escalation of War | | |
| Soviet Press Day | (--) | 5% |
| [Podgornyy Speech | (--) | 2%] |
| FRG Political Debate | (8%) | 4% |
| on Treaties | | |
| Soviet Radio Day | (--) | 4% |
| Middle East | (1%) | 3% |
| China | (2%) | 3% |

Peking (1312 items)

| | | |
|------------------------|--------|-----|
| Domestic Issues | (29%) | 41% |
| Indochina | (33%) | 17% |
| [RGNUC 2d Anniversary | (--) | 3%] |
| [Sihanouk in DPRK | (--) | 3%] |
| [PLAF Successes | (2%) | 2%] |
| [Strikes on DRV | (3%) | 2%] |
| [Nixon 26 April TV | (5%) | 2%] |
| Speech | | |
| [Paris Talks | (5%) | 2%] |
| May Day | (0.1%) | 12% |
| PRC Rights to Senkakus | (--) | 6% |
| Asian Table Tennis | (--) | 4% |
| Union Inauguration | | |
| UNCTAD Session, Chile | (3%) | 3% |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

President Nixon's 8 May TV speech in which he announced the mining of DRV ports and other measures to interdict the delivery of supplies has been treated by Hanoi and the Front in standard fashion. The PRG and DRV spokesmen in Paris promptly issued statements, and the speech was assailed in a Commentator article in the party organ NHAN DAN and an article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as well as in radio comment. Official reaction came on the 10th in a DRV Government statement. Typically, the usual Washington-dated TASS report appeared in advance of Hanoi's reaction. But Moscow's sensitivity regarding the speech is indicated by the absence of any followup Soviet comment. Consistent with past reaction time, Peking media have not yet reported the speech. Official statements have been issued by North Korea and Romania.

Avowals of Vietnamese determination to continue the struggle have continued to pervade both routine and authoritative propaganda. For example, a 6 May DRV Foreign Ministry statement pictured the strikes against Nam Dinh city that day as demonstrating that U.S. "imperialism" can be "even more savage than Hitlerite fascism" but declared that the Vietnamese cannot be shaken by bombs or threats.

Claims that the Vietnamization policy has been dealt a severe blow have been repeated in Hanoi and Front comment on the offensive, including a speech by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap at a 5 May North Korean army day reception. Giap declared that the "resounding victories" in the South are "heralding the inevitable fiasco of the utterly sinister and ruthless 'Vietnamization' policy of the Nixon Administration."

A PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the 8th protested alleged U.S. shelling over the weekend of two Chinese ships anchored off the DRV. The statement demanded that the United States prevent the recurrence of such incidents but made no reference to Chinese aid to Vietnam. Unlike the Chinese statement, a DRV Chamber of Commerce statement on the incident denounced the Nixon Administration by name and claimed that the United States could not undermine maritime relations between the DRV and other countries.

PRESIDENT'S 8 MAY SPEECH PROMPTS DRV GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

The first monitored mention of the President's TV speech in Vietnamese communist media came in a Hanoi radio commentary broadcast at 1450 GMT on 9 May--some 13 hours after the speech was delivered. Entitled

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"Frantic Arguments, Hopeless State of Mind," the commentary said that in order to justify his escalation of the war, the President rehashed the charge of a DRV invasion of the South. It went on to report in detail the four measures the President said the United States would undertake--mining of entrances to DRV ports, interdiction of the delivery of supplies in North Vietnamese territorial waters, cutting of rail and other communications, and continuation of air and naval strikes against military targets in the DRV. Minutes before the commentary was broadcast, Hanoi radio claimed to have set two U.S. destroyers afire during "the bombing and shelling of a number of populous areas in Haiphong city" by "many" U.S. warships.

The Hanoi radio commentary was followed by an LPA report of the President's speech and the transmission of the PRG and DRV Paris spokesmen's statements. Early on the 10th Hanoi radio broadcast a NHAN DAN Commentator article and a commentary from QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, and at 1600 GMT Hanoi broadcast the text of a DRV Government statement--the vehicle normally used to respond to a major U.S. pronouncement or policy decision.* The statement said that the President had announced measures aimed at stepping up action against the DRV "to the most barbarous degree ever," and that right after his announcement U.S. air and naval forces mined and sealed off the various ports of North Vietnam. It went on to declare that

this represents an extremely adventurous and foolish step of war escalation and an extremely brazen aggression by the Nixon Administration, which has very grossly violated the sovereignty and territory of the DRV. This is also an arrogant challenge to various socialist countries and various peace- and justice-loving nations and to public opinion in the world and in the United States.

The statement echoed the earlier radio and press comment when it called the action a violation of elementary principles of international law and of the right to free navigation and free

* The most recent government statement was that of 11 April responding to the U.S. step-up of air and naval attacks on the North. Earlier government statements on Indochina developments during the Nixon Administration included those of 12 June 1969 on U.S. troop withdrawals, 6 November 1969 on the President's speech outlining his Vietnamization policy, 30 April 1970 on the incursion into Cambodia, and 10 February 1971 on Lam Son 719.

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trade. It also echoed other propaganda when it said that the series of new U.S. escalations of military action have been taken in the hope of salvaging the collapsing Vietnamization policy. The statement declared that "the extremely adventurous and insane step of war escalation" in mining and blockading DRV ports "is only the desperate action of someone at the end of his tether."

The statement went on to dramatize Vietnamese intent to pursue the war when it said: "The Vietnamese people have full determination and strength to persevere in their just and certainly victorious struggle even if they have to fight for five or 10 years or more." No previous government statement issued during the Nixon Administration had used the slogan on determination to fight for a decade or more. Following the 16 April air strikes against Haiphong and Hanoi, the DRV radio had opened its main news programs for several days by playing a recording of Ho Chi Minh's 17 July 1966 appeal in which he had said, among other things, that the Vietnamese would fight on even if the war lasted 10 or 20 years and Hanoi and Haiphong were leveled. Prior to that, reference to the possibility of such a prolonged war had come up only infrequently in recent years, although Ho's "teaching" that the war might last for 10 or 20 years was recalled in a 17 January 1972 NHAN DAN commentary pegged to the President's troop withdrawal announcement. The current statement further underscored Vietnamese determination when it called for implementation of the 16 April party-government appeal and reiterated the North's resolve "to fulfill the obligation of the great rear toward the kith-and-kin South."

The statement typically concluded with an appeal to fraternal socialist countries and other countries and peoples to "demand" an end to U.S. aggressive actions and a positive U.S. response to the PRG's seven points. It went on to express "firm confidence" that in the face of the latest developments, the governments and peoples of fraternal socialist countries and people of the world "will strengthen their support and further assist the just resistance against U.S. aggression" (The 11 April statement had called on the fraternal countries to extend "even stronger support and assistance," while the 16 April joint appeal had expressed thanks for past aid and had seemed to seek a show of political solidarity when it expressed confidence that fraternal allies and other friends "will give us more active support and condemn" U.S. schemes and acts of war.)

While the comment and the government statement referred to the socialist countries, there has been no acknowledgment that the President stressed the role of the Soviet Union in supplying military

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aid to Hanoi or that he had appealed directly to Moscow. The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 10th said that "Nixon's decision to mine Haiphong port and to encircle the territorial waters of the northern part of our country is an act that encroaches in an extremely grave way upon our sovereignty and infringes on the right to free movement on the seas and the right to trade on the part of various countries." Without mentioning the President's decision on mining the harbors, a NHAN DAN editorial on the 10th repeated the pervasive claim that Vietnamization is being frustrated and added that "escalating the war to the point of risking a confrontation with many big powers is a very dangerous gamble for the Nixon clique."

Propaganda prior to the President's speech had stressed the recent U.S. naval and air buildup and had contained considerable speculation about various possible future U.S. military moves, including the dispatch to South Vietnam of U.S. Marines or a landing on North Vietnamese territory. The possibility that the United States might mine Haiphong harbor was raised in Hanoi radio commentaries on the 6th and 8th and in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 9th. The commentary on the 8th exuded confidence when it said that the situation in which President Nixon is attempting to "Americanize" the war is one in which the balance of forces has undergone continuous changes in favor of the Vietnamese people and when

our people and armed forces in North Vietnam have powerfully counterattacked the U.S. pirates' war escalation by means of their air force and when our people and armed forces in South Vietnam have been continuously launching offensives and uprisings throughout the past month, dealing crushing blows to the U.S. puppets and causing Nixon's Vietnamization-of-the-war policy to collapse.

POLITICAL Neither the radio and press comment nor the
SETTLEMENT government statement acknowledged that the
 President outlined conditions under which the
mining and other military actions would be stopped--the return
of U.S. POW's and an internationally supervised cease-fire
throughout Indochina, after which all remaining U.S. forces in
Vietnam would be withdrawn in four months. However, the government
statement went on at some length regarding the U.S. stand on
negotiations, and it made Hanoi's first allusion to the private

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meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho.* It claimed that the United States "still clung to its arrogant eight-point peace plan which the Vietnamese have resolutely rejected" at the recent two plenary sessions of the Paris conference and at the private meeting on 2 May. It added that the United States had resorted to all manner of "tricks" to sabotage the Paris talks and that the President had "brazenly fabricated the story" that the Vietnamese people demand that the United States surrender and that they will impose a communist regime on the 17 million South Vietnamese.

The statement echoed other propaganda in rejoicing that the United States was attempting with its eight-point plan to force the Vietnamese to lay down their arms, to accept the "lackey puppet" administration in Saigon, and to accept U.S. "neocolonialist" rule. It then spelled out "the main contents" of the PRG's seven points--in effect an abridgement of the 2 February elaboration--as being an end to the war and to Vietnamization, total repatriation of U.S. troops, the immediate resignation of Thieu, liquidation of the Saigon "machinery of cruel oppression," the formation of a three-component government of national concord, general elections for a constituent assembly, and the setting up of a government.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS U.S. SUSPENSION OF PARIS TALKS

Hanoi responded to the United States' 4 May announcement that it was suspending participation in the Paris talks in the same fashion that it had reacted to the 23 March decision. Thus, the VNA account of the 4 May session charged that the U.S. delegate had "committed another sabotage act, a very serious one, by unilaterally announcing the indefinite postponement of the conference." It added, without detail, that Xuan Thuy and Mme. Binh had issued separate statements "vehemently protesting this act" and pointing out that the Nixon Administration "must bear full responsibility for the consequences." On 6 May, U.S. "sabotage" of the talks was denounced in a NHAN DAN Commentator article and in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement. The 23 March suspension of the talks

* At this writing Hanoi media have not reported Xuan Thuy's departure statement in Paris--carried in VNA's service channel from Paris to Hanoi at 0936 GMT on the 10th--in which he said that Kissinger, in the meeting with Le Duc Tho and Thuy, had not advanced anything new but had merely repeated the eight points which had previously been rejected.

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and the President's 24 March press conference had prompted a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 27th and a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 28th.

Commentator said that the United States was forced to return to the talks on 27 April as a result "of the tenacious struggle" of the two Vietnamese delegates at Paris and because of the protests from world and U.S. public opinion. But the article complained that President Nixon in his 26 April speech had demanded that the Paris conference discuss the problem of "North Vietnam's invasion of South Vietnam" and the release of POW's.

Commentator also said that Ambassador Porter, "seeking another pretext for undermining the Paris conference," had advanced eight "nonsensical" demands at the 4 May session which amounted to two basic demands: 1) that the South Vietnamese end the present offensive and stop their struggle for independence, and 2) discussion of a political solution for South Vietnam but with the condition that the Thieu administration remain intact.

Unlike the Commentator article, the foreign ministry statement on the 6th did not mention U.S. demands that the Paris conference discuss the invasion of South Vietnam or the ambassador's eight questions. But it said that the U.S. eight-point plan had been advanced in an attempt to force the Vietnamese to lay down their arms and to accept the Saigon administration. It added that in addition to obstructing the Paris conference, the United States "is spreading unfounded rumors about private meetings in order to create new obstacles and sabotage the conference." It concluded that the "stubborn and warlike nature" of the United States is shown by the fact that the Nixon Administration announced the suspension of the Paris talks for an unlimited period at a time of U.S. intensification of the war.

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MOSCOW REPORTS NIXON SPEECH; LITTLE COMMENT ON VIETNAM ISSUES

Moscow reported President Nixon's 8 May speech with the usual factual TASS report some 10 hours after the speech was delivered, a reaction time comparable to that on his 26 April speech. The TASS report, also broadcast by Radio Moscow to domestic, Vietnamese, and other audiences a few hours later and printed the next day in PRAVDA, was restrained and of a time-marking character; it failed to acknowledge the President's remarks addressed to the Soviet Union, although it did say he "alleged" that U.S. actions are not directed against any other country.

TASS reported both the President's announcement on military actions and his proposal on efforts to achieve a settlement. It noted pointedly that of three possible courses of action, the President outlined--withdrawal, negotiations, or decisive military action--he "admitted" that the majority of Americans favor the first. In acknowledging the announcement on the mining of approaches to DRV ports and strikes against other DRV communication lines, TASS observed that the President tried to "justify" these "open aggressive acts," which it said increase American interference in Vietnam and violate international law, by the need to save the lives of 60,000 American soldiers and by the "pretext" that there is a "communist threat to South Vietnam."

TASS took note of the President's statement that the military actions will cease as soon as the American POW's are released and an internationally supervised cease-fire comes into effect, after which the United States would withdraw all troops within four months. But it concluded with the comment that although the speech contained "quite a number of reassurances" that the United States wants to end the war and bring its troops home, the actions announced by the President "speak of something quite different."

Since the release of the TASS report, Moscow not only has studiously avoided comment on the speech, but in its reportage generally avoided publicizing the fact that the President ordered the mining of entrances to DRV ports. Several reports on the 9th briefly cited AP as saying U.S. aircraft have started laying the mines, but only one mentioned that the President ordered it. On the 9th and 10th, brief reports of critical reactions in various countries either failed to mention the President when scoring the mining or, if they mentioned the President, did not specify the nature of the

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"new military action" he had ordered. Reporting that antiwar demonstrations took place in the United States and that the New York Stock Exchange fell in the wake of the President's speech, TASS merely said these developments were reactive to "new military measures" announced by the President. TASS reports of the statements made by the DRV and PRG representatives in Paris noted that they condemned "new acts of war" by the United States but did not specify that they were responsive to the President's speech.

Hanoi seemed to be trying to remind the USSR that Soviet as well as North Vietnamese interests were threatened when it reported, on 10 May, a DRV Chamber of Commerce statement charging that U.S. aircraft had damaged a Soviet merchant ship in DRV territorial waters on the 9th, "inflicting extensive damage to the ship and wounding four seamen, one of whom was seriously wounded." Moscow has yet to report this incident. In the past the DRV has used Chamber of Commerce statements to support official Soviet protests over damage to Soviet ships in DRV waters, the most recent case being the episode of 16 April.

Prior to the President's speech, Moscow media had briefly reported the NSC meeting held on 8 May, noting that the participants included Secretary Rogers, who had returned from Europe, and Kissinger, who postponed a trip to Japan. Moscow cited some Western press speculations about possible moves in Vietnam discussed at the meeting, but ventured no comment of its own beyond the remark that such meetings have in the past resulted in "escalation of aggression."

SOVIET AID Other Moscow comment prior to the President's address continued to exhibit caution in dealing with Vietnam issues. Consistent with its practice over the past month of generally ignoring U.S. statements on Soviet military equipment used in the current offensive in South Vietnam, Moscow failed to report Secretary Rogers' remarks on the subject at the NATO Council meeting in Brussels on the 5th.

While Moscow has not played up the issue of Soviet support in recent comment, Defense Minister Grechko's order of the day on VE-Day, reported by TASS on the 8th, did briefly reaffirm that the USSR is giving "assistance and support" to the Vietnamese people and other Indochinese "patriots." Last year's order of the day had not mentioned Soviet aid. Grechko's PRAVDA anniversary article, as summarized by Moscow radio on the 8th, accords with last year's in failing to mention Soviet aid in the course of brief remarks on the war.

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On 6 May Moscow radio reported in Mandarin that Soviet Vice Premier Novikov--the official who in the past has signed Soviet-DRV aid agreements--received the DRV charge d'affaires for talks "in a cordial and friendly atmosphere," but the report did not indicate the substance of the talks. TASS and Moscow domestic service newscasts did not carry this report, although it was published in PRAVDA on the 7th. The characterization of the talks is similar to the description of talks on 12 and 13 April between the DRV ambassador and Brezhnev and Kosygin. There was no reference to "unity" of views, as there was when the ambassador saw Grechko on 13 April or when the DRV charge d'affaires met Katushev on the 17th. The Moscow meeting may have served in part to balance the current visit of a DRV official in the PRC to discuss Chinese "supplementary" aid (discussed below in the Peking section of this TRENDS). A supplementary aid agreement between Moscow and Hanoi was signed on 29 December.

PARIS TALKS Moscow has thus far reacted only with routine-level propaganda to the U.S. refusal on 4 May to continue participating in the Paris sessions. It had reacted in much the same way to the U.S. suspension of the talks on 23 March. This time as in March, Moscow duly reported but failed to lend authoritative support to the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the U.S. move. On 4 May TASS promptly but briefly reported Ambassador Porter's announcement that the U.S. and Saigon delegations "refuse to set a date" for the next session; it followed up with brief accounts of the statements by the DRV and PRG delegates denouncing the U.S. decision but asserting that the quest for a peaceful settlement should continue and expressing readiness to take part in the next session of talks.

Moscow comment assailed U.S. "obstructionist tactics" in Paris, routinely accusing the United States of refusing to negotiate and of "sabotaging" the talks while at the same time escalating the conflict and seeking a "military solution." Commentators cited the Vietnamese delegates' assertion in Paris that a solution must be sought at the negotiating table and that "serious talks" are the best way to solve the Vietnam problem peacefully. In the same vein, the 16 April TASS statement on the U.S. bombings of Haiphong and Hanoi had said that "the path of negotiations without attempts at blackmail and diktat is the only way to resolve the problem of Indochina."

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On 6 May TASS reported the statement made in Paris the day before by a DRV representative--unpublicized in Hanoi media--to the effect that there had been a closed-door meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on 2 May. TASS noted that the substance of the talk was not disclosed but cited the DRV spokesman as saying that if meetings of the Paris conference are to be resumed, it is necessary "first of all" to begin "serious talks." The TASS report also noted White House spokesman Ziegler's confirmation that the secret talk had taken place.

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ROMANIA, DPRK ISSUE STATEMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

Moscow's East European allies have all reported the President's speech but most have followed the Soviet example in withholding official reaction. However, the Bulgarian foreign minister voiced a "sharp protest," and maverick Romania issued a government statement on the 10th.

Reporting the President's announcement on the mining of DRV ports and his proposals on moves toward a settlement, most of the East European comment has denounced the measures as an escalation of the war and a violation of international law and has called for a return to the Paris talks for a political settlement. Most of the available commentary has been restricted to general charges that the U.S. move aggravates the international situation and imperils world peace, but some low-level East German comment has referred more directly to Moscow's interests in the situation, and an Hungarian commentary briefly speculated on the effect of the move on the Soviet-U.S. summit.

The Romanian Government statement condemned the U.S. actions as a "serious transgression of international law," a violation of the UN Charter, and a threat to "international peace and security." It went no further than to reaffirm "solidarity" and "support" for the Vietnamese struggle and to demand a resumption of the Paris talks for a political settlement.

According to Sofia media on the 9th, the Bulgarian foreign minister voiced a "sharp protest" and termed the U.S. action an "unprecedented act of gross violation of the international norms" when he received the U.S. ambassador, who gave him a copy of the U.S. letter to the president of the UN Security Council. The foreign minister warned that the action "creates prerequisites for an increase of tension in the international situation" and added that Bulgaria, which maintains trade with the DRV, "is directly affected" by the U.S. move. According to BTA on the 9th, a Bulgarian Fatherland Front official received the DRV charge d'affaires and emphasized that the Fatherland Front will continue to help the Vietnamese people "materially and morally."

An East Berlin radio commentary on the 9th broached the Soviet role when it said that the mining is an effort to "separate the DRV from its friends throughout the world," adding that military equipment as well as medical and economic aid is shipped in through Haiphong. The commentator called it "the height of impudence" for President Nixon to "hold the Soviet Union responsible for exacerbating the war."

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A Budapest MTI commentary on the 9th, observing that the President has assumed an "extremely grave responsibility" with his military move, noted that it is an election year in the United States and that "Europe is the scene of encouraging developments and Nixon himself has been preparing to visit the Soviet Union this May." According to MTI, the President sought to give the impression that peace and rapprochement continue to be his aim, but his words "carried not much conviction." A dispatch from New York broadcast by the Budapest domestic service on the 9th, citing comment on the speech in the United States, noted that "while he did not even mention Peking, Nixon's speech and the measures announced were aimed against the Soviet Union; open provocation and deliberate risks are mentioned." The correspondent concluded that "it seems probable that Nixon has reduced the chances of his Moscow visit to a minimum."

A Prague radio commentary on the 9th, while not directly discussing Moscow's interests in the development, said that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries will continue to support the Vietnamese people and recalled that Gorchko's VE Day order of the day repeated that the Soviet Union will render support and assistance.

ALBANIA In routine comment on the President's announcement, Tirana has again played the theme of Soviet-U.S. collusion. A domestic service commentary on the 9th and one by ATA on the following day denounced the mining and asserted that the President is presenting a "humiliating ultimatum" to the Vietnamese. They cited the President's remarks on Kissinger's meeting with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, quoting the President as saying the Soviets showed an interest in ending the war on a basis just to both sides and indicated that they would use their "constructive influence." The ATA commentary also noted the President's reference to a "new relationship" with the Soviet Union.

DPRK Pyongyang reacted promptly with a foreign ministry spokesman's statement on the 9th which assailed the U.S. "blockade" as a "very grave criminal act violating the sovereignty and security of the Vietnamese people" and "an insolent challenge to the world people." Pyongyang does not normally comment at this level or this promptly on Presidential statements on Vietnam, and internal evidence suggests that the statement was initially prepared as one of the DPRK's standard expressions of support for DRV Foreign Ministry statements

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protesting U.S. bombings. The references to the President's speech are contained in a paragraph inserted in an otherwise routine statement supporting "recent" DRV statements condemning U.S. bombing.

A 10 May NODONG SINMUN editorial assessed the President's speech in more detail and with typical vitriol. The editorial called the blocking of the DRV ports "a new criminal act expanding the war of aggression in Vietnam to an extremely grave stage," a "grave menace to peace in Indochina and Asia and the world," and "a vicious challenge to the world peace-loving people." It attacked the President personally as "a truculent warmonger, murderer, and vicious enemy of peace." Claiming that the new measures demonstrate the bankruptcy of the U.S. talk of peace and of the Vietnamization plan, the editorial concluded with a routine affirmation of "active support" for the Vietnamese people.

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PRC PROTESTS U.S. ATTACKS ON CHINESE SHIPS OFF NORTH VIETNAM

Consistent with its normal reaction time, Peking has not yet reported President Nixon's 8 May announcement on mining North Vietnamese ports, but a foreign ministry statement issued less than 15 hours after the President's speech protested alleged U.S. shelling of two Chinese merchant ships during the period 6 to 8 May. The statement, dated the 9th, charged that U.S. warships and aircraft repeatedly attacked the Chinese ships anchored near Vinh and that Chinese crew members and Vietnamese civilians were wounded and the ships seriously damaged. Calling this "a grave provocation" against the Chinese people and expressing "great indignation," the statement lodged "a strong protest" and demanded that the U.S. Government prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

While thus putting a protest on record, Peking's reaction to the alleged shelling exhibits the restraint which has marked its approach to recent developments in Vietnam and reflects its interests in the improved Sino-U.S. relationship. In contrast to the last previous protests over similar incidents, in late 1967 and early 1968,* the statement made no reference to Chinese aid to the Vietnamese. The previous statements had charged that the United States was attempting to prevent Chinese aid and to blockade Vietnam, and had reaffirmed Chinese determination to continue providing aid. Also absent from the current statement was any mention of Sino-U.S. relations, apart from a pro forma warning that the U.S. Government must bear full responsibility for "all the grave consequences" of such incidents. In place of the politically charged elements present in past protests, the current statement reserved the right to demand compensation for losses--a new element that seems also to defuse the incident.

DRV REACTION Immediately on the heels of the Chinese protest the DRV Chamber of Commerce issued a statement condemning the alleged bombing of Chinese ships and pointedly linking the incident with alleged attacks on Soviet

* The comparable previous foreign ministry statements were on 1 February 1968, 7 January 1968, and 2 December 1967. There were subsequent, less authoritative statements--by spokesmen of the foreign ministry or of "the department concerned"--charging provocations against Chinese fishing vessels on the high seas.

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and other East European ships during the 16 April raids on Haiphong. Unlike the Chinese statement, the DRV one denounced the Nixon Administration by name. The DRV statement also made a point of claiming that U.S. moves could not undermine the maritime and trade relations between the DRV and other countries, though there was no reference to the President's 8 May announcement. NCNA promptly reported the DRV statement, duly including its references to previous attacks on Soviet ships and to shipping between the DRV and other countries.

CHINESE CAUTION Prior to the foreign ministry protest Peking had conspicuously avoided issuing official statements on Vietnam developments. Until last month Peking had regularly seconded official statements by Hanoi, but an 11 April DRV Government statement and subsequent statements--including party-government appeals by both the DRV and the PRG--did not elicit Chinese statements on a comparable level.* Even Peking's practice of textually replaying official Vietnamese communist statements was breached in the case of a 6 May DRV Foreign Ministry statement on U.S. air strikes. NCNA's account omitted the charge that the strikes had "the express purpose" of killing civilians and that "the utterly obdurate, bellicose, and ruthless nature of U.S. imperialism" has proven to be "even more savage than Hitlerite fascism."

Peking's caution has also been exhibited in PRC media's coverage of battle developments, consisting of pickups of Vietnamese communist reports and commentary. In editing these accounts Peking has skirted some of the more optimistic communist appraisals of the situation, and the only acknowledgment in PRC media of the communists' claim to have established a "provisional people's revolutionary committee" in Quang Tri Province was an LPA report carried by NCNA on the 9th which mentioned the office of such a committee for Quang Tri town.

In general, Chinese leaders have continued to avoid commenting on Vietnam even as visiting speakers have raised the subject. As to be expected, however, Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien referred to the Indochina war in speaking at a banquet on the 8th welcoming Sihanouk to Shenyang. Excerpts of Chen's remarks disseminated by NCNA contained no specific reference to the

* Peking's most recent statement seconding one by Hanoi was a 10 April PRC Foreign Ministry statement in support of a comparable DRV statement of 6 April protesting U.S. air strikes.

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current offensive in South Vietnam. Chen routinely pledged Chinese support for the Cambodian "and the other Indochinese people" in their war against "U.S. aggression."

DRV AID OFFICIAL Peking has publicized the presence of DRV Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly San "to discuss" the PRC's 1972 economic and military "supplementary assistance" to Vietnam. The 1972 supplementary aid protocol was signed in Peking on 11 January by the DRV ambassador and a PLA deputy chief of staff. NCNA's announcement on Ban's arrival on 3 May departed from past practice in noting specifically that the official had come to discuss aid and that he had been sent by the party central committee as well as by the DRV Government. Hanoi has not thus far reported the visit.

NCNA reported on the 6th that Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-nien met Ban that day in "a very cordial and friendly atmosphere"-- a characterization used by Peking for meetings with close allies and one used for Chou's previous meeting with a DRV aid delegation last July. Other Chinese officials present included Communications Minister Yang Chieh, who had returned to Peking by air that day after an extended tour of North Vietnam in the wake of the U.S. raids on Hanoi and Haiphong in mid-April, and the head of the armament section of the PLA logistics department.

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DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT SCORES STRIKES AT NAM DINH CITY

A 6 May DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting the air strikes at Nam Dinh city is the first protest against the U.S. strikes to be issued at that level since early April. A DRV Foreign Ministry statement had appeared on 6 April, and a government statement on the 11th had condemned the President's decision to step up air and naval attacks in the face of the communist offensive in the South. But since the 16 April DRV party-government appeal pegged to that day's strikes against Haiphong harbor and the Hanoi area, the DRV had been issuing its frequent official protests at the level of the foreign ministry spokesman.

After protesting the Nam Dinh city strikes in the foreign ministry statement of 6 May, Hanoi reverted to the spokesman's level on 7 and 8 May, even though one such protest on the 8th broke new ground in saying the United States had "deliberately struck" at the dike system and a second scored strikes near Hanoi that day. Although a 10 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary charged that by the "intentional" bombing of the dike system President Nixon "had sullied U.S. honor and offended the American people's conscience," other available comment has not echoed that charge.

The reported U.S. shelling of populated areas of Haiphong by U.S. ships on the 9th and U.S. raids on Hanoi, Haiphong, and Yen Bai and Hai Hung provinces on the 10th have not yet drawn protests, although Hanoi media reported that two U.S. destroyers were damaged on the 9th and one on the 10th by Haiphong forces. Also on the 10th, the media reported that 16 planes had been downed in that day's actions--nine over Hanoi, three in Haiphong and two each in Yen Bai and Hai Hung. The reports on the plane downings over Hanoi charged that U.S. planes "attacked many residential quarters, hospitals, and other places" in the city and damaged "a number of historical relics." It said "many" U.S. pilots were captured. Those downings brought Hanoi's total of claimed U.S. planes to 3,558, with 112 allegedly downed since 1 April.

Hanoi's protest against the 6 May raids on Nam Dinh city at the level of a foreign ministry statement indicated that it viewed those strikes as a serious escalation. The statement called them "a new step of war escalation, a very serious one and an utterly blatant act of aggression" against the DRV, characterizations somewhat harsher than the spokesman-level descriptions of U.S. strikes as "barbarous acts of war" or "criminal" or "frantic war escalation acts."

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Underlining charges that the U.S. targets were nonmilitary, the foreign ministry statement used language common to other recent protests when it said the strikes were "for the express purpose of killing the civilian population and destroying economic, cultural, and social establishments"; specifically, it charged that in Nam Dinh, the United States "mobilized a great number of aircraft in successive attacks" to "indiscriminately" bomb areas of "heavy population, factories, and public facilities," and it claimed that many civilians were killed or wounded and many houses and other property were destroyed. But a VNA report on the 7th suggested another possible reason for the level of the protest when it pointed out that Nam Dinh is "the textile city and third largest" in North Vietnam and that the strikes took place while the population was taking its "noon siesta." That report also vaguely mentioned "many" deaths and injuries, but no precise statistics have been issued. (The VNA report claimed that the Nam Dinh antiaircraft units "shot down two Phantom jets.")

Unlike recent protests by the spokesman, the foreign ministry statement asserted that U.S. "sabotaging" of the Paris talks "in a serious manner" and the "frantic increase" of U.S. air, naval, and marine forces off the coast of Vietnam as well as the escalation allegedly represented by the Nam Dinh raids constitute "proof" that the Administration "is sticking to its scheme to use armed violence to salvage the 'Vietnamization' policy." The 11 April government statement had similarly suggested that the Administration had embarked on "new military adventures against the DRV" in hopes of salvaging Vietnamization. Like that statement, the 6 May foreign ministry statement affirmed the Vietnamese people's will to continue the war. It warned that "for all its bombs, its insolent threats, and its perfidious schemes," the United States cannot "shake the iron-like determination" of the Vietnamese to fight.

Stating that "we will smash all its military adventures against North Vietnam and will bring to naught its 'Vietnamization' plan in South Vietnam," the statement said the DRV Government "most vehemently denounced to the world public this crazy, savage war escalation." It appealed to the "governments and peoples of the fraternal socialist countries, the countries cherishing peace and justice, international organizations, the world people and the people of the United States to act even more resolutely and more forcefully to stay the blood-stained hands of the U.S. aggressors." Appeals to the socialist countries have been formulated in various ways since the 6 April foreign ministry statement, which called on

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the "governments and peoples of the fraternal socialist countries" and others to check the "new military adventures" of the United States and demand that it end Vietnamization and respond to the PRG's seven points, including the two-point elaboration. The 29 April foreign ministry statement on President Nixon's 26 April TV speech repeated this formulation. The 11 April government statement called on the "governments and peoples of the fraternal socialist countries" and others to "stay the hands" of the United States and increase support and assistance to Vietnam as well as to Laos and Cambodia. This formula recurred in a foreign ministry spokesman's statement on the 13th, although such appeals have normally not appeared at the spokesman's level.

CHARGES IN SPOKES- MAN'S PROTESTS

A 4 May spokesman's statement charged that U.S. planes on the 3d "kept barbarously attacking many populous areas" in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area, "causing many civilian casualties including 10 pupils of the primary school of Ky Lam village, Ky An district," and that U.S. ships "shelled a number of coastal villages in Thanh Hoa and Quang Binh provinces." Three planes were reportedly downed.

A 5 May protest charged that on the 4th U.S. planes "savagely struck at many populated areas" in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and that U.S. ships "wantonly struck at populated areas of Nghe An and Ha Tinh."

The spokesman charged on 7 May that "along with barbarously attacking Nam Dinh city," U.S. planes and ships on 5 and 6 May attacked "many densely populated areas" in Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. It said five planes were downed and three ships "set afire."

The first of the two spokesman's protests on the 8th said that on the previous day U.S. planes and ships "barbarously bombarded many populous areas" in Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. It charged that U.S. planes "also deliberately struck at the dike system in Nam Ha." It said two planes were downed and one ship "set afire."

In the second protest on the 8th, the spokesman said the United States continued on that day to "bomb and strafe many localities in Ninh Binh, Nghe An, Ha Tinh" and Vinh Linh and "to strike at a number of populated areas in Ha Tay, west of Hanoi." It claimed that two planes were downed, and a VNA report specified that they were downed in Ha Tay.

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DRV, PRG LAUD MONTH OF "VICTORIES," EXPANDED "LIBERATED AREAS"

Communist achievements in the first month of the "offensive and uprising" in South Vietnam were highlighted in a 6 May communique of the South Vietnam PLAF command which claimed that "brilliant victories" have dealt "a very hard blow" at Vietnamization and brought a "quick change" in the balance of forces on the battlefield, creating major changes in the war situation. Listing specific achievements, the communique claimed that during the past month the "armed forces and people" had killed, wounded, or captured more than 90,000 allied troops, of whom 10,000 were captured. This claim duplicates the communists' allegation at the time of the 1968 Tet offensive that 90,000 troops were put out of action in the first 30 days of fighting.

The PLAF communique listed numerous South Vietnamese Government military units allegedly eliminated or badly damaged in the offensive, stating among other things that the ARVN 3d and 22d divisions were "wiped out." The communists also claim to have destroyed or captured 750 tanks and armored vehicles, 2,300 military trucks, and 460 cannon of 105-mm and 175-mm caliber, as well as "tens of thousands" of guns. The communique said 530 aircraft were downed or destroyed. In addition, according to the communique, 40 major allied bases were destroyed, 19 military sectors, subsectors, and installations in district capitals "wiped out," and "thousands of other positions" either overrun or abandoned.

A 7 May NHAN DAN editorial, pegged to the PLAF communique, underlined the alleged scope of allied losses when it observed that "almost half" of the 13 ARVN regular divisions had been "annihilated or heavily decimated"* and that the ARVN had lost "almost half its tanks and armored vehicles and almost one-third of its artillery." The impact of the attacks on the ARVN has been stressed in other comment, including an 8 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article which compared the current period

* Summing up ARVN losses by division, VNA on the 9th claimed that--in addition to the 3d and 22d divisions, which were "taken out of the roll-call"--the 1st, 5th, 18th, 21st, 23d, and 25th divisions and the airborne and marine forces each lost from one to three brigades or regiments. The 2d, 7th, and 9th divisions each allegedly lost from one to four battalions.

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to 1965, when the ARVN was "attacked and disintegrated . . . chunk by chunk," and to the 1968 Tet offensive when the ARVN was dealt "a stunning blow." The army paper commented that in these prior cases "U.S. expeditionary troops were deployed to provide a military shield and morale prop and to create conditions for the puppet troops to consolidate themselves." The article observed that "the situation has now changed" since the bulk of U.S. troops have withdrawn and the ARVN has "no protective shield, no stable rear base, and no peaceful time to consolidate."

LIBERATED AREAS The PLAF communique, like other propaganda, stressed the importance of the expansion of communist control in South Vietnam. It asserted that "uprisings" have been coordinated with the armed attacks and claimed that "two more million of our people have seized control and liberated their native lands."* Describing the "newly liberated areas" as being "linked to one another and to the old ones to form a comprehensive, organic system," the communique said that these areas are being built and consolidated and are "serving the front in an active manner by contributing, in terms of manpower and wealth, to the victory of the resistance war." The role of the newly controlled territory had been pointed out for example, by the North Vietnamese military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor) in an article published in the 3 May issues of NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.** Chien Thang asserted that "the enlarged liberated areas are serving as extended offensive springboards" and added that "the source of our strength has been extended, whereas the enemy's replenishment sources have been increasingly limited."

* As a result of the Tet offensive, the PLAF command communique at the end of 1968 similarly claimed that "uprisings" that year had "liberated" an additional 1,000 hamlets containing more than two million "compatriots." At the end of 1968, the communists were claiming control over 11 million people in South Vietnam. Vietnamese communist propaganda has avoided mentioning figures on total population control in South Vietnam since 1969, and the current communique similarly contains no such figure.

** The Chien Thang article is discussed in the 3 May TRENDS, pages 4-6.

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Also on the 3d, a Liberation Radio commentary noted that "the creation of many large, firmly interdependent liberated areas not only contributes toward splitting the enemy's strategic posture, but also is of great significance because these liberated areas serve as springboards for extending our offensive and uprising" and "bring into existence a vast rear base directly providing human resources for the frontline struggle." The commentary went on to stress the "urgent and major task" of "consolidating" these areas, both to serve the offensive and to demonstrate "the superiority of a genuinely revolutionary regime that really cares for the livelihood of the masses." Among other things, the commentary urged normalization of the economy and production, indoctrination of the newly "liberated" people, and the formation of guerrilla and militia forces and combat villages and hamlets.

In a similar vein, a 6 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial hailed "the liberation of many additional large, densely populated areas" and claimed that "the expansion of the liberated areas is one of the important factors in changing the balance of forces and the war situation to our side's advantage and to the enemy's disadvantage." It echoed other comment in noting the role of these localities as a rear area, a springboard for attacks, and a source of men and materials. Citing the tasks of liberated areas, the editorial highlighted the need to carry out combat-related construction and to "build nucleus leading forces," strengthening those "loyal to the revolution" and consolidating the "contingent of cadres." The editorial claimed that many locations have set up "popularly elected revolutionary administrations" and that, "on the basis of positively building political forces, the newly liberated areas have concentrated on building the armed forces" in their regions. "Each liberated area," according to the editorial, "must possess forces ready to fight immediately and forces prepared for long-term activities in order to keep the initiative under all circumstances." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN called upon youths in these areas to join the army and "compatriots" to "serve as civilian laborers on the firing line and support combat."

STATEMENT ON
ALLIED "CRIMES"

A 7 May PRG Foreign Ministry statement accused the United States of committing "genocidal crimes" against "newly liberated provincial capitals and district towns in South Vietnam." The statement alleged that the United States has attacked urban

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areas controlled by the communists with planes, including B-52's, and warships. "More serious still," it charged, "the Nixon Administration has ordered aircraft to carry out saturation bombing" on various townships and the provincial capitals of An Loc and Quang Tri "with the extremely inhuman purpose of wiping away everything, including the wounded puppet troops left behind in their flight, destroying all houses, pagodas and churches, and all the ecology in these areas." The statement maintained that these "criminal acts" have caused "serious losses in life and property." It called upon the socialist people and governments and others to "condemn in time and take resolute actions to stay the bloody hands of the Nixon Administration and intensify support and assistance to the South Vietnamese people's struggle."

QUANG TRI Propaganda in the wake of the communists' capture of Quang Tri Province is predictably jubilant, with comment pointing out that this is the first time in nearly 20 years of fighting in South Vietnam that a province has been totally "liberated." Discussing the military significance of the fall of Quang Tri, both Front and Hanoi media, including a 4 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, claim that the communist forces smashed a major allied defense system and thereby undermined the allies' tactic of relying on strong fortifications, armored forces, strong artillery fire, and air power.

The propaganda called attention to alleged support of the Quang Tri population for the "liberation forces" and noted at the outset that efforts were being made to organize the people--to build "administrations," strengthen "combat villages," and so on. Finally, on 4 May, Hanoi and Front media announced that a "people's provisional revolutionary committee" had been set up in Quang Tri city and released a communique from the committee. This document proclaimed the abolition of the previous administration. It called on officers and soldiers of the Saigon army and police and employees of the former administration to "report to the revolutionary power," bringing with them weapons and documents; demanded that order and security be preserved and property respected; and underlined the need to "keep military secrecy and assist the PLAF and the revolutionary power."

HUE Communist media are not, for the most part, discussing the military situation around Hue, although an 8 May LPA roundup of fighting in the South recalled the fall of Fire Base Bastogne (designated Dong Tranh base by the communists) on the night of 28 April and observed that the liberation armed forces were "putting pressure on the enemy southwest of Hue city."

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On 4 May Liberation Radio publicized an appeal, dated the 3d, from the Thua Thien-Hue Liberation Front and People's Revolutionary Committee and the Hue Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces which called on "compatriots" in Hue and in district capitals to "join the offensive and uprising movements" and to "take to the streets," firmly "refusing to follow the cruel puppets in their retreats and struggling to overthrow Thieu and "regain control of the city." Declaring that "the hour of firm action has struck," the appeal called for the launching of attacks and uprisings to commemorate 19 May (Ho Chi Minh's birthday), to implement Ho's testament, and to "repay the kindness of our northern compatriots who have aided and are aiding us to the fullest extent." It warned of allied efforts to use civilians as a "shield" against attacks, to muster people to help defend Hue, and to bomb and shell areas so as to "force our compatriots to follow the remnant troops in their retreat." The people were urged to oppose these measures, which were labeled "the frenzied reaction of the enemy in his death throes." They were also asked to help refugees from Quang Tri and to "persuade" them to return home.

BINH DINH The capture on 2-3 May of Landing Zone English--the last government position in northern Binh Dinh Province--and other communist achievements in the central Trung Bo delta provinces of South Vietnam have prompted Hanoi press comment noting the significance of the liberation of these "densely populated and wealthy" areas. A 4 May NHAN DAN editorial, hailing the fall of Landing Zone English (designated De Duc Base by the communists), summed up alleged achievements in the province, claiming, for example, that from 9 to 29 April 11,000 allied troops had been put out of action, including 2,500 captives and defectors. According to the editorial, the liberation forces have also captured the district capitals of Hoai An, Hoai Nhon, and Tam Quan, and the military subsector of Vinh Thanh. In addition, it said, these forces have "liberated" Hoai An and Vinh Thanh districts,* part of Hoai Nhon district, and "many areas" of Phu My, Phu Cat, An Nhon, and Binh Khe districts.

The editorial commended the Binh Dinh "armed forces and people" for "smashing" the allied pacification plan "in an important area, liberating many densely-populated areas linking one district with

* Vinh Thanh is a district designated by the communists which includes a portion of the GVN district of Binh Khe.

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another, and creating extremely favorable new opportunities" for the resistance. Noting the application in Binh Dinh of the communists' 10-point promelyting policy which encourages the assimilation of broad elements of the population, the editorial reiterated the line that "except for a minority and a small number of cruel hooligans, the majority" of those in the Saigon army have been "forced to remain in the ranks." It claimed that "almost all the civil self-defense forces and scores of civil guard and self-defense units had laid down their weapons or turned them on the "hooligan commanders" and "returned to the people."

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on 5 May reviewed alleged communist advances throughout the central Trung Bo delta area, highlighting action in Binh Dinh but also claiming that in Quang Nam (roughly corresponding to the GVN province of Quang Tin), for example, the district of Hiep Duc had been "liberated" along with a "large area" from the outskirts of Tam Ky city to Hiep Duc. Underlining the "strategic importance" of "initial victories" in the central delta area, the editorial said the allies are being deprived of sources of manpower to help the ARVN recover its strength. It claimed that "with the densely populated and interdependent liberated areas and with the weapons seized from the enemy, the revolution has acquired new conditions for further stepping up the local people's war, developing its offensive position, and extending its offensive springboard." The army paper maintained that, in the current phase of fighting aimed at defeating Vietnamization, the "acceleration of the people's regional war is of great strategic significance."

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PEKING MARKS SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT

Peking marked the second anniversary of the formation of Sihanouk's government in exile (RGNU) on 5 May, as it did last year, with a greetings message from Chou En-lai to RGNU Premier Penn Nouth. There was no PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, as there was last year, although some low-level Peking comment praised the RGNU's accomplishments. Chou's message, unlike the one last year, included an implicitly anti-Soviet jab when it stressed that the RGNU is the "sole legitimate government" of the Cambodian people that has been recognized by "an increasing number of countries."

An NCNA commentary on the anniversary warned that "certain powers" are trying to set up a "Khmer third force" to "split" Sihanouk's front (FUNK) and government and to undermine relations between the Cambodians and the North Vietnamese. It recalled that Sihanouk gave a "powerful response" on 19 March when he rejected any compromise with the Phnom Penh regime and refused to negotiate with a third force. Sihanouk had made these remarks at a Peking banquet marking the second anniversary of his arrival in the PRC capital and of the formation of the FUNK and Cambodian liberation army. On the same occasion, Chou had also assailed "certain powers" for trying to set up a "Khmer third force," an apparent denunciation of the Soviets and possibly the French as would-be mediators.*

As in 1971, Moscow ignored the RGNU anniversary, consistent with its failure to recognize Sihanouk's government. Moscow had given the FUNK anniversary moderate attention, in line with its public support for the struggle of the Cambodian "patriots," but it did not mention either Sihanouk or his government.

* Peking used the earlier anniversaries to put on a major show of support for Sihanouk's movement. See the 22 March TRENDS, pages 23-25.

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SALT AND DISARMAMENT

MOSCOW CONTINUES ROUTINE COMMENT; PEKING REAFFIRMS STAND

Moscow comment on SALT continues at a routine and minimal level, totally ignoring the optimistic remarks reportedly made by Secretary Rogers during his foreshortened European tour. Two commentaries in Moscow's English-language service on 5 and 6 May--before President Nixon's speech on Vietnam--discussed SALT within the broad context of the Soviet "peace program." Citing statements by Brezhnev, the commentaries routinely affirmed that the Soviet Union is in favor of a "mutually acceptable" SALT agreement on the basis of the principle of equality between the USSR and the United States without either side seeking unilateral advantage over the other. The plenary meeting of the SALT delegations in Helsinki on 9 May went unreported in Soviet central media, as is often the case.

Speaking at the third UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), PRC delegation deputy head Lin Ping on 4 May reaffirmed Peking's standard line on disarmament. Lin denounced the "two superpowers" for their "stepped-up arms expansion and war preparations . . . and their strife for world hegemony," declaring that in this context the question of disarmament "cannot possibly be settled." He also reiterated Peking's call for a world summit conference to discuss the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, "to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons." Lin's statements in effect update Peking's refusal to participate in the five-power nuclear conference and the world disarmament conference proposed by the USSR or to take its seat at the Geneva disarmament conference when it reconvenes on 20 June. They also represent a rejection of the Soviet invitation, made authoritatively by Brezhnev in his 20 March speech, to have "other" nuclear powers become "participants" in such arrangements as the September 1971 Soviet-U.S. accords on measures to lessen the risk of nuclear war.

Lin's speech--made against the background of public speculation about a forthcoming Soviet-U.S. SALT accord and just two weeks prior to the scheduled Presidential visit to Moscow--also included an oblique denunciation of any agreement to be reached

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by the two powers. Noting that the "superpowers" are "talking about disarmament every day" but actually engaging daily "in arms expansion," Lin declared that "the so-called nuclear disarmament which they are supposed to seek is entirely for the purpose of monopolizing nuclear weapons in order to carry out nuclear threats and blackmail."

Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the 8th predictably took Lin to task for his "bewitching but empty talk about the disarmament issue." The radio pointedly suggested that if Peking wants disarmament it "should adopt a positive attitude toward disarmament" at either the Geneva talks or the UN General Assembly, adding that "the Chinese leaders completely ignore" the Geneva talks and take a "negative attitude" at the United Nations toward the Soviet call for a world disarmament conference.

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MIDDLE EAST

GOLDA MEIR IN ROMANIA: BUCHAREST CAUTIOUS, MOSCOW COOL

Soviet media virtually ignored Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's 4-7 May official visit to Romania, reflecting Moscow's evident coolness toward Bucharest's initiative. Romania's publicity for the visit was correct but carefully measured, reflecting sensitivity to the Soviet reaction and to the delicate nature of Bucharest's position in the tangled area of Middle East diplomacy.

SOVIET REACTION The Moscow central press--with the exception of PRAVDA--carried a one-line TASS report from Bucharest noting Mrs. Meir's arrival. Not until the 8th did PRAVDA mention the visit, briefly reporting her departure and carrying a short item, broadcast the day before by Radio Moscow's Arabic service, noting doubts expressed by Cairo's AL-AHRAM that the visit had brought tangible results.* The only other monitored Soviet report was a two-line item carried in Moscow's domestic service on the 8th observing that the communique on the visit said the talks were held in a cordial atmosphere and that the two sides exchanged views on bilateral relations and "a number of international problems."

Radio Moscow commentaries on 3 and 4 May, broadcast only in Romanian, reiterated Soviet charges that "imperialist and Zionist circles" were trying to disrupt Soviet-Arab relations, pointed to the USSR's economic and military support for the Arabs, and cited Cairo sources as praising Soviet-Egyptian friendship and cooperation.

ROMANIAN COVERAGE Mrs. Meir was given somewhat less attention than Romania usually accords visitors of her rank from noncommunist countries. Bucharest media reported that official talks with Prime Minister Maurer opened on the 4th, and AGERPRES summarized speeches at a dinner given by Maurer that evening. The news agency quoted Maurer as saying Romania supports

* The Romanians apparently have taken pains to reassure Cairo about the visit: The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 7th reported Romanian embassy sources in Cairo as telling MENA that Ceausescu stressed to Mrs. Meir the need to implement Resolution 242. He also emphasized, MENA said, that Bucharest will not recognize any form of foreign occupation and that it advocates an end to "the policy of expansion by force."

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a Middle East settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242, presupposing Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories; in a notably brief, two-paragraph summary of Mrs. Meir's remarks, it mentioned that she "outlined" Israel's position on the conflict and expressed agreement with the Romanian view that problems between states must be solved peacefully.

Bucharest media did not report more explicit statements by Mrs. Meir, publicized by Jerusalem radio, on the possibility that Romania might use its influence to facilitate an Arab-Israeli settlement. Jerusalem radio on the 5th reported her as saying Israel believes Romania could "use its influence on the Middle East countries in leading them to open negotiations." A similar remark was said to have been made by Mrs. Meir in talks with Ceausescu, and Jerusalem radio on the 6th cited "Romanian Government sources" as saying Ceausescu had tried in those talks to find a formula that would make it possible to bring the Arabs and Israelis to the negotiating table. Ceausescu, according to the Israeli radio, did not suggest Romanian mediation.

Bucharest reported no details of Ceausescu's 5 May meeting with Mrs. Meir or of the "short toasts" at his luncheon for her that day. It reported their "continued" talks on the 6th without explaining, as Jerusalem radio did, that the second round of talks with Ceausescu necessitated cancellation of a scheduled second meeting between Mrs. Meir and Maurer.

The bland communique, as carried by AGERPRES on the 7th, says the talks were held in a "cordial atmosphere" and that bilateral relations are developing normally. In the only specific reference to the Middle East conflict, the two sides merely support continued efforts toward a peaceful settlement. The communique notes Meir's invitation to Maurer to pay a return visit; in addition, according to a Jerusalem radio account on the 6th, she invited Ceausescu to visit Israel, an invitation not publicized in monitored Romanian media. Reporting Mrs. Meir's return to Israel on the 7th, Jerusalem radio said that details of Ceausescu's visit "have not yet been decided."

'NIN' INTERVIEW WITH CEASESCU On the day of Mrs. Meir's departure, AGERPRES reported an interview Ceausescu granted to the Yugoslav weekly NIN in which the Romanian leader repeated Bucharest's position on a political settlement of the Middle East conflict based on Resolution 242, leading to Israeli withdrawal and to a peace in which the integrity and

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security of each state would be guaranteed.* He sidestepped a question alluding to the Meir visit to Romania. Asked "if it is a matter of mediation" or of a Romanian effort to explain the Egyptian stand to Israel, he replied vaguely that Romania explains its position and viewpoints on paths of a political settlement.

Against the background of apparent Soviet displeasure with Romania's recent diplomatic efforts, Ceausescu reasserted his country's right to independently "elaborate its political line." He remarked that "attempts are being made to return to a certain negative state of affairs" in the world communist movement--an apparent allusion to the Soviet Union's efforts to get its allies to "coordinate" their foreign policy with Moscow. Ceausescu underlined the need for "equality" among parties as well as for "recognition that the existence of a leading center is no longer possible."

MOSCOW DECRIES CRITICISM OF ITS AID TO ARABS, MIDEAST POLICIES

Soviet comment in the wake of Egyptian President as-Sadat's recent talks in Moscow suggests continued sensitivity to Arab criticism of the USSR's aid to Egypt and of Soviet policies in the Middle East. In addition to the stock complaints about "imperialist and Zionist intrigues" aimed at discrediting Soviet policies, a 5 May PRAVDA article by P. Demchenko deplored the activities of "openly rightist, anti-Soviet elements" in "certain Arab countries." These elements, he charged, seek to undermine the internal social reforms and the foreign policy orientation of "the progressive Arab countries" and try to "smear" Soviet-Arab relations by describing them as temporary or "by alleging that Soviet aid is insufficient." Demchenko asserted that such allegations became more widespread on the eve of as-Sadat's Moscow visit, requiring "Egypt's statesmen and the progressive Arab press" to deal a "decisive rebuff to the

* Jerusalem radio reported on the 8th that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had investigated reports that Bucharest radio that day had broadcast a statement by Ceausescu saying a Mideast solution involving Israeli withdrawal will be achieved through Resolution 242. The foreign ministry ascertained, the radio said, that "no additional communique" from the Romanian president concerning the Middle East had been published in Bucharest.

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hostile attacks." Demchenko's focus on alleged attempts to introduce discord, the continuing efforts in other commentaries to defend Soviet-Egyptian relations, and a marked stress on Soviet help in strengthening Cairo's military-defense potential suggest that Moscow is not convinced that the Egyptian leadership has quelled the criticism.*

GRECHKO VISITS TO SYRIA AND EGYPT The Cairo AL-AHRAM's 9 May announcement of Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's forthcoming visit to Egypt, as yet unmentioned by Moscow, was foreshadowed by Egyptian minister Faw'ud Murad in a statement broadcast by Radio Moscow in Arabic on the 4th and repeated on the 8th. He said that as-Sadat's talks in Moscow gave rise to the hope that "other meetings will take place, in Egypt this time," which will decisively end "rumors and attempts to cause disunity and discord" between the two countries. AL-AHRAM, according to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, said Grechko would visit Cairo after his current talks in Syria. Quoting a "Soviet source," the paper said his discussions would be a continuation of the recent as-Sadat-Brezhnev talks in Moscow. (Grechko was last in Cairo in February, two weeks after as-Sadat's 2-4 February visit to Moscow.) Suggestive of preparations for the Grechko visit, MENA reported on the 8th and the 9th that Hafiz Isma'il, presidential adviser for national security affairs, had received Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov on both those days.

Grechko's 10-14 May Damascus visit, announced by TASS on the 6th, is presumably designed to make up for his scheduled December visit, canceled when he reportedly became ill while visiting Iraq. His itinerary at that time was also to have included Somalia, which he visited in February prior to his talks in Cairo. AL-AHRAM's 9 May report said Grechko's Syrian visit "might be extended for some time depending on the progress of the Syrian-Soviet discussions"--a possible allusion to strong Soviet pressure to obtain Syrian consent to a Syrian-Soviet treaty, which Arab press reports say Damascus has been

* An analysis of Egypt's situation by the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG's foreign political editor, reported by Radio Budapest on 4 May, said the Egyptian leadership was concentrating on consolidating the domestic front and holding down the "extremists"--which he identified as reactionary elements as well as "impatient leftists who would push Egypt into action for which it is unprepared."

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reminting. Damascus radio revealed on 3 May that the Syrian army chief of staff had been in Moscow when it reported, without elaboration, that he had returned to Syria from the Soviet Union that day.

AS-SADAT TOUR In line with its treatment of as-Sadat's previous visits to other Arab countries, Moscow has given meager publicity to the Egyptian president's 4-6 May talks in Algeria, also attended by Libya's al-Qadhafi, and his 6-8 May visit to Tunisia; Soviet media apparently have not yet mentioned his 8-10 May stay in Libya. TASS did briefly report the communique on the tripartite talks in Algiers, as well as the Tunisian-Egyptian communique. Predictably, TASS' account of the second document failed to include the passage in which the two presidents expressed their belief that the United States and the Soviet Union "should intervene now to find a satisfactory solution as soon as possible" in order to prevent further exacerbation of the Middle East conflict.

Belyayev, participating in the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable on 7 May, spoke approvingly of the rapprochement among the three Arab countries at the Algiers meetings, assessing the relationship between Egypt and Algeria as "particularly important." A Moscow broadcast on 6 May in Arabic and in French to Africa, pegged to the tripartite talks, recalled that during as-Sadat's Moscow visit "special emphasis" was laid on the fact that "the most important prerequisite" for a just settlement of the Middle East dispute is consolidation of the unity of all Arab peoples on an anti-imperialist basis. The broadcast added that every Arab delegation visiting the Soviet Union has understood Moscow's attitude on this "very important question." It conceded that there are obstacles to unity, such as "the differences between various parties and movements and between some Arab countries," but it maintained that conditions are suitable for the unification of the "anti-imperialist, progressive forces" in the Arab east.

USSR PRESSES POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, PLAYS DOWN "OTHER MEANS"

After initial hesitation, Soviet commentators are now making more frequent reference to the new formula in the 29 April Soviet-Egyptian communique asserting the Arabs' right to use "other means," as well as political methods, to regain their land. But Moscow also continues to pursue its line on a political settlement, maintaining that the Soviet Union is

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committed to this course and that the Arabs are still trying to achieve a peaceful political solution. Thus a Ramadan foreign-language commentary on 4 May insisted that the USSR "feels duty-bound" to help bring about such a settlement. Calls for implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 also continue to appear. Kudryavtsev argued in IZVESTIYA on the 5th that a "totally practicable plan for a political settlement" exists in that resolution.

While some Soviet comment has cited Egyptian sources or merely reiterated the language of the communique in referring to "other means," the formula has been used in various instances in conjunction with the idea of a political settlement. The most pointed example came from Belyayev, in the domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 7th, when he declared that the Soviet-Egyptian approach to the crisis is characterized first of all by a resolve to press for a political settlement. Belyayev went on to define qualifications for the use of other means, remarking that when Israeli-U.S. actions "threaten the cause of peace in the Middle East" the Arab countries, primarily Egypt, may use other means to liberate the occupied territories. Demchenko, in PRAVDA on the 5th, similarly defined the right to use other means "under conditions" where "hostile forces are not abandoning their plans to thwart a political settlement" and make the Arabs capitulate.

A unique definition of "other means" as pertaining to economic sanctions came in a 4 May domestic service commentary by Ryzhikov which explained that "one such means" contemplated by the Arabs is "economic sanctions against Israel and its allies."

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K O R E A

PYONGYANG MARKS MILITARY ANNIVERSARY, KIM'S 60TH BIRTHDAY

Pyongyang has turned a formerly obscure military anniversary into a major occasion, taking the opportunity to play host to numerous foreign delegations and to embellish the personality cult of Kim Il-song still further. The 40th anniversary of the "Korean People's Revolutionary Army" (KPRA), marked on 25 April, previously had been observed in a minor way* as the anniversary of the founding by Kim of the Korean "anti-Japanese guerrillas." Peking also gave the anniversary considerable publicity, consistent with its generous treatment of similar Korean occasions since the return to normal relations two years ago. Moscow, also consistent with usual practice, marked the anniversary much more modestly.

It is unclear why this anniversary has suddenly been brought into prominence, but it seems to have served several purposes for Pyongyang, with Peking displaying strong support. The Kim Il-song personality cult figured prominently in the celebrations, which came 10 days after the observance of the leader's 60th birthday. The anniversary also seemed designed to reinforce North Korea's international prestige as well as to complement its current drive to open political contacts with South Korea.

PERSONALITY CULT The KPRA anniversary was marked by an unusual number of personal appearances by Kim Il-song at major functions, including a Pyongyang "grand report meeting," a military parade, and a banquet. Kim also personally received the foreign delegations. Surrounding propaganda was replete with praise for the genius of Kim as the founder of the KPRA, the forerunner of today's KPA. A wreath-laying ceremony at the tombs of Kim's parents and grandparents, and a ceremony unveiling a statue of the leader and opening a museum commemorating his "immortal

* The last decennial observance, in 1962, while receiving more attention than the routine annual occasions, was on a lesser scale than this year's. The only prominent foreign delegation participating was a PRC National People's Congress delegation led by Peng Chen which did not come specifically for the anniversary but for a "friendship visit" that coincided with the event. There was a Pyongyang rally attended by Kim Il-song and a military parade, but little other surrounding publicity.

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exploits" were also reported. The latter ceremony was said to mark both the military anniversary and Kim's birthday.

The 60th birthday itself, however, received somewhat less elaborate publicity than might have been expected for an event marking a traditional milestone in the life of a Korean. It may have been thought to be more seemly, for international purposes, to glorify Kim in connection with a reputed feat rather than an ancient custom (the fact that Mao's birthday is never celebrated may have been a consideration). And, in fact, Kim's birthday was observed more as a domestic affair than as an international one. Though numerous foreign messages were received, including from the PRC's and the USSR's top leaders, there were no significant foreign delegations in Pyongyang for the occasion other than one led by the exiled Sihanouk. A "twice-hero of the DPRK" award was granted to Kim by the Supreme People's Assembly; the party, parliament, and cabinet sent a congratulatory message; and a special issue of the party journal KULLOJA was devoted to articles by top DPRK leaders effusively praising the genius of their leader. Kim was also lauded at a "lecture meeting" attended by Politburo members.*

INTERNATIONAL ASPECT

The KPRA anniversary seemed aimed, at least in part, at reinforcing North Korea's international prestige--no doubt with an eye to the forthcoming UNGA debate on the "Korean question," a more open issue this year with the presence of the PRC in the world body. The KPRA anniversary was played as a major international event, with the participation of some 30 military delegations from all of the communist countries except Albania and from many third world countries.

Peking's high-level treatment included the dispatch to Pyongyang of a delegation led by Chen Hsi-lien, Politburo member and commander of the military region adjacent to Korea. The Chinese delegation, along with a Romanian delegation also led by a Politburo-level official, received preferential treatment in Pyongyang consistent with their rank. In Peking, the observance

* Kim's 50th birthday, as might be expected, had been observed on a more modest scale. In addition to foreign greetings there was a party-government message and a NODONG SINMUN editorial, but no special KULLOJA article, award, statue, or meeting were reported.

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included a greetings message to the Korean leaders from Mao and Chou En-lai, a PEOPLE'S DAILY/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint editorial, and a banquet hosted by the DPRK ambassador, attended by Chou and addressed by Yeh Chien-ying, Politburo member and vice chairman of the CCP Military Commission. The PRC leaders' message had been preceded by a message from the same leaders on Kim's birthday, but Peking's observance of the birthday was otherwise not comparable to that of the military anniversary. Reports in PRC media of low-level events in Peking, including an exhibit of Kim's works and photos, Korean film showings, an announcement of the publication in Peking of some Kim speeches, and commentaries praising the DPRK's achievements, were obviously timed for the birthday but were not explicitly linked to it.

Moscow sent a greetings message to Kim on his birthday from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, but there was no other known Soviet publicity for the occasion. Unlike Peking, it did not send a message from the top leaders on the KPRA anniversary, restricting itself to a message from Defense Minister Grechko. The Soviet delegation to Pyongyang was also lower-ranking than the PRC's, being headed by Marshal Moskalenko, a party central committee member and deputy defense minister, a level comparable to that of most of the other communist delegations. Pyongyang followed protocol in according the Soviet delegation the same treatment as it gave the other communist groups not headed by a Politburo-level leader. The KPRA anniversary was marked modestly in Moscow with a DPRK embassy reception addressed by Grechko and a Moscow rally receiving a brief notice.

RELATIONS The treatment of the KPRA anniversary may also be
WITH SOUTH related to Pyongyang's drive to open political
 contacts with South Korea and to capitalize on
growing sentiments favoring unification of the country. Observance
of the founding of an anti-Japanese guerrilla force in 1932,
emphasizing the efforts of all Koreans at that time to expel
foreign occupiers, may have been considered more conducive to this
campaign than celebrating the anniversary of the KPA, an army which
South Koreans fought during the Korean War.* Concern for the

* The KPA anniversary is marked on 8 February. The most recent one, the 24th, was observed on a somewhat less elaborate scale than in previous years. It is conceivable that henceforward the DPRK will hold its main military observance on 25 April rather than on 8 February.

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Impact on the South would accord with Pyongyang's current line calling for a "peace agreement" with the ROK in order to reassure the South that it need not fear an invasion from the North and thus can accept the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Speeches on the anniversary were notable for their lack of anti-U.S. and anti-ROK vituperation. Charges attributing an aggressive intent to the United States and its "puppet" were cast in routine, pro forma terms.

Peking used the occasion to weigh in with support for Pyongyang's moves aimed at "peaceful unification" of Korea. High-level Chinese comment again endorsed Pyongyang's proposals, "especially the important proposal" advanced by Kim in January for a peace agreement and political negotiations between North and South Korea. Apart from chiding the United States for still "occupying" South Korea and "obstructing" unification, Peking did not engage in harsh anti-U.S. attacks and ignored other international subjects such as Indochina.

The treatment of Kim's birthday as mainly a domestic event may also be related to the DPRK's policy toward the South. Reports had recurred in the past that Kim had promised to reunify the country by his 60th birthday. Such a pledge was never attributed to Kim in available North Korean propaganda, but Pyongyang had, in late 1969 and early 1970, quoted South Koreans as expressing a hope that they would celebrate Kim's 60th birthday in a unified homeland. To softpedal the birthday would be consistent with the current realities and Pyongyang's effort to project a more flexible, less provocative image to the South.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

LITERARY GAZETTE RESUMES FEUD WITH NEO-STALINIST WRITERS

The longstanding feud between the moderately conservative LITERARY GAZETTE and the neo-Stalinist wing of the Soviet literary community has again erupted into the open as a result of the recent publication of a new edition of Ivan Drozdov's novel "Underground Meridian" by the Moscow Workers Publishing House. When the original edition of Drozdov's novel appeared in 1968, it was favorably reviewed by the reactionary novelist Ivan Shevtsov and the journal OKTYABR's literary critics. The new edition of Drozdov's novel is accused of slandering Soviet society because of its negative portrayal of the entire Soviet intelligentsia, and the publishing house is under attack for serving as an outlet for similar anti-intellectual works.

The current feud was sparked by a 29 March LITERARY GAZETTE review of Drozdov's novel by Feliks Kuznetsov, chairman of the Moscow Writers Union bureau for literary criticism and a long time critic of the Moscow Workers Publishing House and its bevy of reactionary writers. Focusing on the novel's anti-intellectual bias, Kuznetsov complained that it is aimed at "figures of science, literature, art and journalism" and is an example of the crude "bourgeois" genre of novel (that is, patterned after the anti-intellectual novels of Shevtsov and OKTYABR editor Vyacheslav Kochetov). According to Kuznetsov, Drozdov conveyed his contempt for learning "with extreme frankness," choosing as his hero a factory worker without higher education and with little use for books who outdoes scientists and "creates the most complex electronic computers." He charged that the novel's heroes are "surrounded on all sides" and "suffocated" by "'the educated petty bourgeoisie' who, if you believe I. Drozdov, 'run the show' in our life. According to Ivan Drozdov, they comprise the real basis of the spiritual life of our scientific and creative intelligentsia." Kuznetsov claimed that Drozdov "blackens our real life" and presents "primitive" types as heroes. Noting that the 1968 edition of the novel had been criticized at that time, he assailed the Moscow Workers Publishing House and editor B. Orlov for issuing the new edition.

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LITERARY GAZETTE followed up Kuznetsov's criticism with a 12 April article signed by "Litterateur"--a pseudonym for the editorial board. It criticized the publishing house for releasing the "ideologically-artistically bankrupt" novel and for serving as an outlet for similar reactionary works, citing its publication of such criticized books as Ivan Shevtsov's "In the Name of the Father and the Son," Vladimir Rozanov's novelette "The Dove Vanishes in the Fog," and Viktor Yakovchenko's collection of poems "The Get-Together". The article charged that the publishing house is guided by a "narrow circle of people" and that it issues many books written by its own staff, "despite the serious ideological-artistic defects" in them. It noted that the Moscow Writers Union bureau of critics and prose writers had recently invited leaders of the publishing house to a discussion of its publications in 1970-71, but that the officials in question were "intolerant of any criticism" and had refused to change their ways. LITERARY GAZETTE concluded that the situation at the publishing house "can no longer be tolerated."

Nevertheless, Drozdov struck back in a letter assailing LITERARY GAZETTE and Kuznetsov for their criticism of his book and their charge that it "blackens all scientists." Published in the 26 April LITERARY GAZETTE, the letter accused Kuznetsov of "open slander" in declaring the "ideological harmfulness and artistic bankruptcy" of the novel and the "irresponsibility" of the publishing house for printing it. LITERARY GAZETTE's editors responded with a long attack upholding Kuznetsov and reiterating their criticism of the publishing house. The editors also noted the "unjustifiably enthusiastic" reviews of the first version of Drozdov's book by Shevtsov in the 12 July 1968 SOVIET RUSSIA, V. Marchenko in the January 1969 OKTYABR, and A. Vlasenko in the August 1969 OKTYABR.

Both LITERARY GAZETTE and Kuznetsov have long been critical of neo-Stalinist writers. The intensification of LITERARY GAZETTE's feud with OKTYABR last year prompted PRAVDA to intervene on behalf of LITERARY GAZETTE (18 May 1971). Kuznetsov complained as far back as 1965 that the Moscow Workers Publishing House had issued Shevtsov's novel "The World Is Not Without Good People" in 100,000 copies and had followed up with "three massive reprintings in one year" (IZVESTIYA, 23 September 1965). In 1968 he sharply criticized Kochetov, Shevtsov, and Rozanov (ZHURNALIST, April 1968), and in 1971 he pointed to the "direct ideological-political harm" caused by Shevtsov's novels (KOMMUNISTSKAYA PRAVDA, 20 May 1971).

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